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Chapter 13
THE BANKING SECTOR AND THE MONEYFLOWS OF
OTHER TRANSACTORS
By tar the chief importance —'atthis writing, at any rate —ofthe 100%
system would be its power to mitigate the present depression and, in the
future, to lessen not only depressions but the booms which lead to depression.
recovery was apparently well started by the Federal Reserve open-
market purchases, which revived prices and business from May to Septem-
ber 1932. Unfortunately, the efforts were not kept up.... Itwould have
been still easier to prevent the depression almost altogether.
With plenty of money, there could be no fall of prices, and without a fall
of prices, the subsequent links in the depression chain would be almost
non-existent. ..
The100% system would not prevent the little ripples, but it would prob-
ably prevent all, or at least, most, of the great overwhelming waves. Irving
Fisher, 100% Money (Adelphi, 1935)', pp. 105, 114-5, and 120.
The wave of speculative activity inthe stock market in the late twenties
became the occasion of grave concern.
The failure to check the speculative movement revealed the essential
weakness of monetary policy,' even as a device to check the boom. It was not
possible, by means of Central Bank control over credit, to ensure adequate
funds for productive uses and to choke off funds for speculative uses.
recently. ... Wehave been privileged to observe what contribution
can be made by the utmost limit of Central Bank action toward economic
recovery.
for the extremely important area of residential building, for the gen-
eral run of intermediate and small-scale enterprise, for the more risky ven-
tures, and for small cities and communities, cheap money in the banking
system offers no adequate remedy. For these areas fantastically high reserves
'and a high degree of bank liquidity are apparently of little avail. Alvin H.
Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles (Norton, 1941), pp. 76, 77, 78,
and 81.
WHEN A HARVARD PROFESSOR AND A YALE PROFESSOR disagree so
sharply, it is little wonder that the public is somewhat confused about the
role of banks and U. S. monetary funds in the cyclical fluctuations of
moneyflows.
There is a persistent notion, we suspect fostered by the hydraulic anal-
ogy, that banks and U. S. monetary funds alone can cope with substan-
tially the whole problem of unemployment except that of a seasonal or
frictional nature. Various economists have held this yiew, among them
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Fisher. On the other hand, the passages quoted from Hansen seem to
indicate that banks and U. S. monetary funds cannot advisedly do much
of anything about cyclical unemployment.1
During the seven years covered by our moneyflows accounts business
activity rose to a 'peak in 1937, took a sudden major dip, recovered, and
under the stimulus of the defense and war program in 1941 and 1942
was expanding toward a level that few had thought possible. In the light
of our moneyflows accounts we offered in Chapter 12 part of a tentative
hypothesis.concerning the nature of the processes of expansion and con-
traction in moneyflows. In this chapter we shall extend this tentative
hypothesis to cover the question, How far are banks and U. S. monetary
funds in a position to influence cyclical fluctuations in moneyflows?
1Bank Credit and the Federal Reserve
The two primary parties to a moneyflow transaction are the payer and
the, payee. In Chapter 12 our consideration of the question, Who exer-
cises discretion over moneyflows? was confined to that exercised by pri-
nary parties. Both the Federal government and banks and U. S.
monetary funds have some voice in moneyflows to which they are third
parties. The influence of banks and U. S. monetary funds on cyclical
fluctuations is necessarily pretty much a third party affair. They are third
parties to more than 99 percent of the moneyflows that arise in connec-
tion with ordinary transactions.
If we are to see how this indirect influence operates we must first have
in mind the moneyflow transactions to which banks and U. S. monetary
funds are primary parties. At various points we have indicated that the
negative cash balances of banks serve them in just the same way as posi-
tive cash balances serve other transactors. We can show this by giving a
journal entry for a cash purchase by the banking sector. The entry is
precisely the same as that in Chapter 5, Section 2, except that we must
remember we are presenting a consolidated account for banks and U. S.
monetary funds. The banking sector makes cash settlements with other
1) Banks and U. S. Dr customer ex- 3) Dealer Dr cash
monetary funds penditures
2) Banks and U. S. Cr currency and de-4) Dealer Cr receipts from
monetary funds posit liabilities customers
transactors by increasing its currency and deposit liabilities just as a non-
bank transactor makes such a settlement by drawing down his cash hal-
'In Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy (McGraw-Hill, 1949), Hansen allows a
somewhat larger role to the banking sector. But he still shows a marked preference
for fiscal over monetary and bank credit policy in dealing with business fluctuations.282 CHAPTER13
ance. The cash balance of banks and U. S. monetary funds decreases
algebraically speaking (for there is an addition either to currency outside
banks or to deposit liabilities) and the cash balance of,the payee increases.
The largest ordinary items in the statement of payments and balances
for the banking sector (Table 40) are receipts of cash interest and expen-
ditures on gross cash pay. Bank payrolls are a small fraction of the
payrolls for all transactors. Their interest receipts are a much more sub-
stantial factor in the national cash interest account, and we would
undoubtedly be warranted in assuming that banks have a good deal of
discretion in respect of thisreceipt item (and also their service charges).
Banks and U. S. monetary funds exert an influence on the moneyflows
of other transactors through interest costs to borrowers. However, we
believe the nature of this influence can be approached more effectively
through an analysis of lending and borrowing than through the national
cash interest account.
From time to time we have had occasion, in discussing other sectors to
resolve the net financial flow into its components. Such .a resolution is
imperative with banks and U. S. monetary funds. Their net financial
flow is not zero (although theoretically it always might be just that);
actually during the seven years their ordinary receipts averaged a few
hundred million more than their ordinary expenditures and 'they ad-
vanced (or returned) the excess through financial channels each year.
But banks and U. S. monetary funds are only a very minor net financial
source of money to other transactors, as can be seen from line h.
The large and widely variable items in the moneyflows of the banking
sector are the chief components of this net financial flow: the changes in
the gold stock, in the size and composition of bank credit (loans and
securities), and in total currency and deposit liabilities.
If we pass overthe possibility of influencing the moneyflows of other
transactors by modifying exchange rates and the purchase prices of gold
and silver, and by issuing and retiring flat currency, the main channel of
influence open to banks and U. S. monetary fund is their participation
in the markets for loans and securities. Commonly total bank credit and
total cash balances of nonbank transactors are concurrently increased
(or decreased) by purchases (or sales) of loans and securities. The influ-
ence of banks and U. S. monetary funds on the moneyflows of other
transactors is exerted in part through the effects of changes in these two
totals. Influence is exerted also through the effects of changes in the
composition of bank credit and through the interest charges and other
terms on which credit is extended.BANKS AND OTHER TRANSACTORS' MONEYFLOWS 283
These various lines of influence must be traced through three stages:
first within the transactor group, banks and U. S. monetary funds, second
in the loan and security markets, and third in the relations between these
markets and the readjustment processes affecting the ordinary receipts
and expenditures of nonbank transactors
To bring out clearly the relations between banks and U. S. monetary
funds and the rest of th economy, we have treated this sectbr as if it
were a single transactor, quite separate from the Federal government, by
presenting a consolidated statement for it.2 But one must not be misled
by this device. The sector consists during the seven years of about 15,000
transactors (most but not all of which are private enterprises) plus a
number of public supervisory authorities. We have often spoken of this
assemblage as the banking sector, but it certainly does not behave like a
single bank with 15,000 or more branches. However, power to influence
bank deposits and the buying and selling of loans and securities by banks
is vested in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
in the System's Federal Open Market Committee, and the issue and
redemption of paper currency is now largely concentrated in the Federal
Reserve banks.
When we asked how banks and U. S. monetary funds affect cyclical
fluctuations in the moneyflows of other transactors we had in mind public
policies toward the moneyflows of domestic nonbank transactors that
can be implemented through the bank supervisory and central banking
functions of the Federal Reserve System. We have proposed for sim-
plicity to narrow the question by passing over channels of influence that
are currently not likely to be pressed when it is so construed (exchange
rates, gold and silver transactions, and flat issues and redemptions). The
first stage of our question, therefore, focuses on the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem and the influence it exercises over total bank credit and its composi-
tion, total nonbank cash balances, and bank interest charges and credit
terms. Our answer here will be restricted to listing the most pertinent
2Muchthe most important part of this statement is Part Two: Loanfunds. With
minor changes and with additional detail this exhibit appears currently in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin under the caption, Consolidated Condition Statement for Banks and
the Monetary System.
In the following pages we shall discuss the Federal Reserve as a separate sector.
But it did not seem worth while to present separate figures for it here, because the
condition statement, Member Bank Reserves, Reserve Bank Credit and Related
Items is so readily available. On the way in which this statement. is fitted into Part
Two of Table 40 see Morris A. Copeland and Daniel H. Brill, Banking Assets and
the Money Supply since 1929, 34 Federal Reserve Bulletin 24ff.284 CHAPTER 13
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functions of the Federal Reserve System for these lines of influence and
noting certain of their limitations:
1) Responsibility for central banking operations and for the supervision
of commercial (and mutual savings) banks is somewhat divided. The
Federal Open Market Committee developed because there was not a
single central bank under a single governing board, and developed as a
substitute for such an arrangement. Federal Reserve controls over com-
mercial banks are confined to member banks, and banks can elect to
withdraw from membership. Responsibility for bank examination is
divided among various governmental units, chiefly among three Federal
agencies; Federal Reserve examiners cover only nonnational member
banks.
2) The two main powers of the Federal Reserve System are open market
operations (under the Committee) and control of member bank reserve
requirements (under the Board). The real function of member bank
reserve requirements has become that of putting the Federal Reserve
System in a position to restrain expansion of the total deposit liabilities
of member banks and total member bank credit. The System's ability to
restrain credit expansion by raising reserve requirements is somewhat
closely restricted by the statutory range within which the Board has
discretion.
•. Alongsidethe Board's control of reserve requirements and the Sys-
tem's open market operations we should no doubt list the Board's redis-
count powers. Although the rediscount powers have been of relatively
little consequence during the past fifteen .years, they are likely to become
important again. But in the interest of brevity we shall omit discussion of
these powers and also of various other channels through which the Fed-
• eral Reserve exercises its influence over the banking sector.
3) The principal avenue of influence on interest rates open to the Fed-
ral Reserve System is not through the rest of the banking sector, but
broadly through its own participation in the loan and security markets.
Its open market operations are mainly in marketable U. S. securities, and
the direct effect of such operations is on the prices and yields of these
securities. There are indirect effects on the prices and yields of other loans
and securities, too; but these indirect effects are likely to be greater on
• rates on short term customer loans and on yields of high grade (and sea-
soned) corporate bonds than on rates on new mortgages. Also they are
likely to impinge somewhat unevenly on different catgories of short
term customer loans. Rates on large loans seem to be more sensitive than
those on small; rates in large centers more sensitive than in smaller places.BANKS AND OTHER TRANSACTORS' MONEYFLOWS 287
When one speaks of interest rates as a channel of bank influence on
the total volume of ordinary transactions it is usually some kind of aver-
age level of rates on new loans and renewals that is meant. But when the
Federal Reserve exerts pressure on the level of interest rates, it exerts at
the same time more or less pressure.on the differentials among various.
categories of rates and of yields. The System's influence over the level of
interest rates cannot well be isolated from its influence on the structure
of rates and yields.
4) If a Federal Reserve bank sells a government bond to —orbuys one
from —anonbank transactor, this operation has a dollar for dollar
effect on total bank credit and total nonbank cash balances (Table 40,
lines X + Y and line b). There is also a potential effect on bank credit
and cash balances that does not register in Table 40. Its nature may be
illustrated most simply on a different assumption.
If a Federal Reserve bank sells a government bond to —orbuys one
from —acommercial member bank, this transaction does not show in
Table 40, because it is an intrasector transaction. But it may have an
effect —amore than dollar for dollar effect —thatwill show subse-
quently. For it subtracts from —oradds to —thecommercial bank's
reserve, and each dollar of reserve means to the commercial bank a
potential source of money of several dollars (the number depending on
the reserve requirements then in effect) through an increase in its
deposit liabilities, and this potential source means in turn an equal poten-
tial disposition of money through an increase in earning assets. The
question whether these possibilities become actualities we defer to the
following, section.
5) The Federal Reserve influences not only the amount of bank credi
but also its composition. However, its influence on composition is some-
what narrowly restricted. The limitations on its influence over the total
of customer loans are particularly significant,3 although to indicate their
significance we must make here a point that properly belongs in Section 2.
There is a recognized perverse cycle in bank credit .analysis (as well
as in other kinds of credit analysis) .Thenumbers of would-be borrowers
who are rated as unsatisfactory credit risks commonly increases during
a business recession (thus tightening credit in one direction, although a
general policy of easing credit may be widely thought advisable). And
during the more optimistic phase of a cyclical upswing the number of
'Federal Reserve selective credit controls bear directly on composition and on cus-
tomer loans, but they are too selective for a broad attack on the perverse cycle in
credit analysis and we may pass them by here.288 . CHAPTER13
unsatisfactory credit risk ratings commonly decreases (easing credit in
one direction, although credit restraints on expansion may 'be official
policy) .Thisperverse credit analysis cycle is difficult to cope with under
any circumstances; historically it has been aggravated by a parallel per-
verse cycle in the credit standards applied by bank examiners., The prob-
lem thus created would be simpler if all bank examining functions were
vested in the Federal Reserve System. Nonetheless in spite of the difficul-
ties inherent in a division of responsibility for bank examination a good
deal of progress toward working out the problem seems to have been
made, at least so far as a period of expansionary influences is concerned.
6) Up to this point we have treated Federal Reserve open market opera-
tions as if they were directed solely with a view to. their effects on .ttal
bank credit and its composition, on total nonbank cash balances, and
on the interest rates the public has to pay. Some economists have
urged that in determining open market operations these considerations•
of credit and monetary policy ought to be permitted to override all
others. But the fact remains that they have not. Open market sales have
been seriously restricted by considerations of their effects on the prices
of U. S. securities —ifnot by a policy of maintaining those pricesat
least by a policy of avoidinga disorderly market 'drop.
We cannot go far into this policy issue here, although our attempt to
trace the effects of Federal Reserve open market operations on the
moneyflows of nonbank transactors (in Sections 2 and 3) has an impor-
tañt bearing on it. Whatever the issue's merits, Federal Reserve credit
restraints are likely again to be hampered by the same considerations,
unless the System's powers are so altered and so exercised that open mar-
ket operations can be effectively used to tighten bank credit without
embarrassing the Treasury.
We set out to trace the influence of banks and U. S. monetary funds
on the volume of ordinary transactions of nonbank transactors. As we
observed, this influence is exerted partly through the totals of bank
credit and of nonbank cash balances, partly through the composition of
bank credit, and partly through interest rates and credit standards. We
said we would trace this influence through three stages. This cursory
examination of the first stage suggests that if it is proposed to use these
lines of influence to moderate cyclical fluctuations in the dollar volume
of total ordinary transactions, the limitations of the Federal Reserve
System in this connection must be kept in mind.
The second stage has to do with the relations between banks and U S
monetary funds and the loan and security markets.:. •.''. ;..•BANKS AND OTHER TRANSACTORS' MONEYFLQWS 289
2Bank Credit and the Loan and Security Markets
We have repeatedly urged that the level of bank credit is riot fixed by
banks and U. S. monetary funds alone. Such centralized discretion
within the banking sector as is exercised by the Federal Reserve Board
and the Federal Open Market Committee conditions and in turn is
conditioned by the discretion exercised by nonbank transactors. We can
now say why it is an oversimplification to conceive of this mutual condi-
tioning as a (money) market or supply and demand readjustment proc-
ess. One phase of this mutual conditioning process, indeed, goes on in
portions of the loan and security markets; but another phase is pècu-
liarly monetary. Hence it is more than a readjustment of terms and
volumes of moneyflow between a set of borrowers and a set of lenders,
more than an adjustment in which we have to deal simply with a dispo-
sition of money by the one set (lenders) and a source of money for the
other set (borrowers). In the money market plus monetary adjustment
we are here concerned with, banks and U. S. monetary funds are engaged
in transactions with two other classes of transactors at once, those whose
obligations they hold and those who hold their currency and deposit
liabilities.
Let us take the case in which cash balances of other transactors are
increasing, and let us continue to pass over purchases and sales of gold
and silver and fiat issue and redemption by U. S. monetary funds (and
also issues and retirements of the capital stock of banks and U. S. mone-
tary funds). Under these conditions banks and U. S. monetary funds
will be deriving a source of money from the additions to their currency
and deposit liabilities, and simultaneously disposing of the money so
obtained by adding to bank credit (loans and securities). For the parties
from whom banks and U. S. monetary funds are obtaining the money
the disposition of funds will take the form of an increase in cash balances.
The parties to whom banks and U. S. monetary funds are adva:ncing the
money will be either increasing their debts or liquidating their portfolios
(or both).
This statement of the case implies that we have to deal with two dis-
tinct sets of transactors in addition to banks and U. S. monetary funds.
Do we? The question requires us to face a. rather slippery point with
respect to the moneyflows accounts. Consider the type of transaction in
which nonbank transactor A gives his note to his bank and acquires a
deposit. To simplify the statement let us speak as if bank credit consisted
exclusively of such customer loans. Under these conditions it is clear that
we have only the two primary parties to deal with. A's increased cash290 CHAPTER 13
balance is a disposition of money by A and a source to the bank. The
'bank's loan is a disposition of money by the bank and a source to A. The
A who advances money to the bank and the A who obtains money
through the bank loan are necessarily the same party. And by our assump-
tion, currency and deposits can increase only through this type of trans-
action. The increments in the cash balances of A and his fellows and the
increments in bank credit are necessarily equal and synchronous, because
they are merely the two sides of the same transactions.4 And for the same
reason those whose cash balances are increased by these transactions
are necessarily the same parties as those who receive the bank loans.
But obviously we must not conclude that each nonbank transactor will
always owe banks and U. S. monetary funds precisely the amount of his
cash balance. For other types of transaction affect the distribution of cash
balances among nonbank transactors, though they do not much affect
the total amount of such balances.5 Therefore, in analyzing the interac-
tion between the discretions exercised by banks and U. S. monetary funds
and the discretions exercised by nonbank transactors and the resulting
readjustment that determines total bank credit and total nonbank cash
balances we must recognize that some nonbank transactors are likely to
be increasing their bank indebtedness while others are increasing their
cash balances.
We shall not stop to restate this argument as it applies to a decrease in
bank credit or to allow for components of bank credit other than cus-
tomer loans, because to do so would not affect our conclusions. In the
total bank credit and currency and deposits readjustment three classes
of transactors must be recognized: those whose cash balances arc increas-
ing (or decreasing), those who are dealing with banks and U. S. mone-
tary funds in loans and securities, and as an intermediary between them,
banks and U. S. monetary funds.6 When total currency and deposits are
'We must consider the discount on A's note as a second and separate transaction. It
is an ordinary expenditure for A and an ordinary receipt for the bank, not a loanfund
tranSaction.
'The effect on the total under the assumed conditions equals the (algebraic) excess
of the ordinary receipts of banks and U. S. monetary funds over their ordinary
expenditures.
'We get three classes of transactors because we look at the bank credit and currency
and deposits readjustment comprehensively. It is not merely the effects of bank loan
and loan repayment transactions that we must consider; it is the combined effects of
these transactions and all other moneyflow transactions on cash balances. For this
comprehensive view we must take account of ihe influence of the ordinary transac-
tions pf banks and U. S. monetary funds on their negative cash balance. During any
period the increment in bank credit, will exceed the increment in total currency andBANKS AND OTHER TRANSACTORS' MONEYFLOWS 291
incretsing, there isa two-step moneyflow from the cash balances class
of transactors through banks and U. S. monetary funds to the loans and
securities class. When total currency and deposits are decreasing, there
is a two-step moneyflow in the other direction.
But we must not make this picture too schematic. The two classes of
nonbank transactors, the cash balances class and the loans and securities
class, may overlap. They may at times even coincide; the back-and-forth
flow may still be of significance, if and when they do. Moreover, the flow
between the two classes of transactors (when they do not coincide) does
not directly depend on changes in total bank credit and total 'currency
and deposits. It may quite conceivably be substantial even in a period of
little or no change in total nonbank cash balances.
Because the total bank credit and currency and deposits readjustment
involves three classes of transactors, we have to deal with three sets of
considerations, those affecting the exercise of discretion by each of the
three classes of transactors. As far as the loans and securities class of
transactors is concerned, nothing in particular need be said here. From
their point of view banks and U. S. monetary funds are in competition
with other transactors in the loan and security markets. If the loans and
securities class can obtain money more cheaply elsewhere (or dispose of
it elsewhere to better advantage) they are in general likely to do so.
A somewhat special set of considerations affects the exercise of discre-
tion by the cash balances class. Cyclical changes in their active cash
requirements tend to make transactors advance money to banks and
U. S. monetary funds during business expansions (i.e., add to their own
cash balances) and call it back as their active cash requirements decline
during recessions. At the same time there are likely to be cyclical changes
in the preferences of these transactors for cash as against other loanfund
balances to perform the longer term value storage function, i.e., changes
in liquidity preference; because of changes in liquidity preference these
transactors tend to advance money to banks and U. S. monetary funds
(increase their claims igainst this sector) during recessions and call the
money back during expansions. Hence cyclical .changes in active cash
balance requirements and in liquidity preference at least partly offset
each other, especially if we are looking at all nonbank transactors as a
single sector.
deposits by the amount of the sector's net ordinary receipts (if, as we assume, the
other loanfund balances of banks and U. S. monetary funds remain constant). But,
as we have seen, net ordinary receipts of banks and U. S. monetary funds are a srral1
item in this total picture.292 CHAPTER13
Between them these two types of consideration —thatfor the short
term and that for the longer term value storage function —exhaustthe
storehouse function. But they still leave something to be said about the
considerations affecting the discretion of the cash balances class. We
must take account of the extent to which these transactors may fail to
exercise their discretion or may be slow about doing it. In Chapter 12
we found reason to expect sheep to advance money when business is
expanding and to obtain money through financing during recessions.
Now sheep are likely to be relatively passive not only in exercising discre-
tion over their spending but also in exercising discretion over the compo-
sition of their loanfund balances. Hence we may expect that a good deal
of what they advance in an upswing and some of what they obtain in a
downswing will take the form of changes in their cash balances. For such
slowness in exercising or failure to exercise discretion over loanfund bal-
ances we suggest the term financial inadvertence.
Between the cash balances class and the loans and securities class stand
banks and U. S. monetary funds. Commercial banks and mutual savings
banks, like the loans and securities class, study the various loan and
security markets to see where they can to best advantage dispoe of any
"money" (excess reserves) they may acquire when business is expanding
and deposits are growing (or to see what earning assets they can most
advantageously liquidate when deposits and reserves shrink). Their
demand for and supply of loans and securities is a component of the total
market demand and supply. In general they buy more than they sell when
nonbank cash balances are increasing, sell more than they buy when such
balances are declining.7
For the individual bank an upper limit is put on the size of its port-
folio by the amount of its deposits,8 and an upper limit is put on its
deposits by the reserve ratio requirements and by the amount of its
reserve and the part of its portfolio that can be converted into reserve.
To this we must add that a gold import deposited in a coastal bank adds
dollar for dollar to its reserve and its deposits. Much of the time most
banks so exercise their, discretion over the composition of their loan-
fund balances that excess reserves (unnecessary nonearning assets) are
promptly converted info portfolios. But certainly the record of the 'thir-
tles makes clear that actual portfolios may remain for a considerable
period below the levels to which they might be expanded. As Hansen so
vigorously points out, the cash balances class is not the only category of
Counting new loans as purchases and repayments as sales by the banks.
BStillruling out additions to bank paid-in capital.BANKS AND OTHER TRANSACTORS' MONEYFLOWS 293
transactors that may, because of a growing liquidity preference, accumu-
late idle balances in the form of anonearning asset (cash). Commercial
banks may do much the same; for them idle balances mean excess
reserves. When commercial banks go in for idle reserve balances, the
effect of Federal Reserve open market purchases on total bank credit
and total nonbank cash balances is likely to be reduced to somewhat
less than a dollar for dollar basis. Even so, and even with present restric-
tionson the Federal Reserve portfolio, the System might, with the volume
of governments now outstanding, be able during a business recession to
prevent a contraction of total bank credit and perhaps to compel an
expansion.
However, we repeat that Federal Reserve influence on the composi-
tion of bank credit is narrowly restricted. Expansion of bank credit does
ndt necessarily mean new customer loans. During 1934-36, when excess
reserves were mounting as gold flowed into the United States, such
expansion of bank credit as did take place was largely in increased
holdings of U. S. securities.
Changes in the composition as well as in the total amount of bank
credit are of consequence because they are parts of the intersector
financial flows in which banks act as intermediaries. During a recession
banks may play a passive role in these flows. Sheep that incur cash
deficits when their receipts decline may perforce draw down cash
balances. Bears that have cash surpluses may retire debts —.including
debts to banks —oradd to their portfolios. The result may be a con-
comitant contraction of bank credit and nonbank cash balances and
a moneyflow from bears through banks to sheep —afinancial flow in
which banks are merely a passive channel.
But banks can play an active role by taking the initiative in con-
tracting their portfolios. Particularly if they contract customer loans,
they are likely to compel their debtors to stint and hoard to pay their
debts. This means banks can convert bulls or sheep into bears, can
initiate the financial flows (from bank-made bears to unconverted
sheep) in which they are intermediaries. There is little or no evidence
that banks so exercised their discretion during the period covered b
our moneyflows accounts. But there can be no doubt that in times past
overly rapid bank credit contraction has accelerated a good many
business recessions or that before the Federal Reserve was established
recessions were sometimes initiated by financial panics in which banks
played a major role.
In respect to policies for encouraging total bank credit expansion the294 CHAPTER 13
Federal Reserve System does not appear to have been restricted by a
quantitative statutory limit on its discretion over reserve requirements,
or by a conflict between an easy credit policy and any policy toward
prices of U. S. securities. But both these kinds of restrictions have applied
to its power to stop or restrain an expansion of total bank credit and
total nonbank cash balances. One who holds that the Federal Reserve
System should at times restrain the expansion of bank credit and non-
bank cash balances without regard to any effects on U. S. security prices
and who is not greatly concerned about the composition of bank credit
may be satisfied with present Federal Reserve powers. One who believes
in bank credit restraints but puts some stress on maintaining an orderly
market for marketable government issues and on the composition of
bank credit will be likely to think there is need for an expansion of
Federal Reserve powers through some form of special reserves proposal,9
or alternatively for an expansion of the open market and rediscount
powers of the System that would permit the inclusion in Federal Re-
serve credit of any item eligible, for inclusion in 'member bank port-
folios.
If banks can convert bulls and sheep into bears, the banking sector
is in a position to restrain a cyclical increase in moneyflows, and to
initiate or accelerate a contraction. •The Federal Reserve has a re-
sponsibility at times for restraining expansion. The chief limitation on
its powers, so far as this responsibility is concerned, is the inability to
isolate its general restraints from a marked depressing effect on the
prices of U. S. securities.
The Fec4eral Reserve is unlikely to wish to initiate or accelerate a
cyclical do*nswing. Rather it has a responsibility for preventing the
banking sector from so doing. For this responsibility its power over
total bank credit may well be adequate; but its influence over total
customer loans is not great. Presumably it would not be able to prevent
banks from contracting them during a major recession.
Can banks convert bears into sheep and sheep into bulls? Their
ability to make conversions in the other direction rests on their right
to refuse a new loan or a renewal. Banks have no corresponding leverage
to induce a man to borrow and spend. But when there are transactors
with bullish inclinations the banking sector can help an expansion of
moneyflows by financing them. Indeed banks can go further than this.
They can actively seek out those with bullish inclinations, counsel them,
and select those with the most"promising projects.
See, for example, Marriner S. Eccies, Proposal for a Special Reserve Requirement,
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Banks influence the moneyflows of other transactors almost entirely
by serving as financial intermediaries; the financial flows in which they
participate are two-step flows. The flows we are now concerned with
proceed from other transactors —chieflysheep —tobulls. We have
said that banks could help an expansion of moneyflows by financing
the bulls. Of course they do not provide the funds themselves. However
for this financing they do not need the consent of those who do put up
the money. When increased bullish spending increases sheep's ordinary
receipts, sheep have three alternatives open to them: they can spend
more, and the more they spend the larger bulls' receipts and the less
bulls will need to raise through financial channels; they can put money
into the loan and security markets themselves by adding to their port-
folios or paying off their debts; or they can allow their cash balances to
grow, thereby advancing money to banks which banks simultaneously
advance to bulls. The first two alternatives require initiative on the part
of sheep; the third represents for the most part their financial inad-
vertence. Bulls get their increased spending financed, in any case; if
banks are willing they can advance whatever money bulls require over
and above any increase in bulls' receipts and over and above what bulls
can raise through nonbank channels. This makes bank credit expansion
a particularly convenient and effective means of financing bulls' ex-
penditures.10 During the seven years for which we have moneyflows
accounts, it was used extensively by the Federal government. If it was
so used by industrial corporations during this period, the annual figures
do not disclose that use clearly (see Section 3 below).
Our central question in this chapter is how the banking sector influ-
ences the ordinary moneyflows of other transactors. Up to this point we
have been concerned to outline the relations of the Federal Reserve
System to the rest of the banking sector and of both to the loan and se-
curity markets and to the cash balances of other (i.e., nonbank) trans-
actors. Before proceeding to the third phase of our analysis of bank
influences on nonbank moneyflows we believe we can draw one broad
conclusion regarding the nature of these. influences. We have several
times spoken of credit and monetary policies, meaning policies that
could be implemented through central bank and bank supervisory
powers over total bank, credit and its composition, over total nonbank
cash balances, and over interest rates and credit terms. We seem to have
gone far enough to recognize (a) that monetary policy in the sense of
policy' toward total nonbank cash balances and their distribution by
°Wetake this to be what is valid in the idea of forced saving.296 CHAPTER13
sectors is scarcely sejarable from policy toward total bank credit, that
bank credit policy is logically all there is to monetary policy in its
broader sense," and (b) that Federal bank.crêdit policy may sometimes
need to be distinguished from Federal credit policy. We have noted that
some Federal bank supervisory functions are vested in agencies other
than the Federal Reserve System. But on the whole we may fairly iden-
tify Federal bank credit policy and Federal Reserve credit policy. How-
ever Federal Reserve policy is only a part of Federal credit policy. The
Federal government comes into contact with the loan and security mar-
kets through channels other than those provided by the Federal Reserve:
farmcredit channels, home owner credit channels, foreign credit chan-
nels, etc. With our present governmental structure Federal credit policy
—whichincludes bank credit policy —maynot always be a unified,
well-coordinated whole.
3The Components of Financial Moneyflows,
According to the tentative hypothesis outlined in Chapter 12 the volume
and composition of moneyflows. in the main circuit during any period
is to be understood as a readjustment of the flows of the preceding
period There are two mutually conditioning aspects of the read justmen
process, one affecting ordinary transactions (product transactions and
transfers),theother affecting financial moneyflows.
The financial flows make it possible for bulls to elect to expand and
bears to contract their ordinary expenditures somewhat independently
of what happens to their ordinary receipts. However, the more closely
other transactors follow the lead of bulls during expansion (or bears
during recession), the less the required net financial flow from others to
bulls (or from bears to others).
Thus far in this chapter our consideration of the channels of influence
there is a technical phase of monetary policy that is not bank credit policy —a
phase that currently on the domestic level is mostly concerned with maintaining con-
vertibility among the various forms of cash balances. The technical phase of monetary
policy is undoubtedly important. But its domestic objective is fairly sharply defined,
and most of the problems of effectuating this objective appear to have been worked
out. Accordingly, in stating the fifth feature of the money circuit in Chapter 12 we
implied that the banking sector would not be functioning properly if convertibility
were not adequately maintained.
We think of this technical phase of monetary policy as broad enough to include
changes in exchange rates, changes in Mint terms of purchase' and sale for gold and
silver, and fiat issues and redemptions. In the interests of simplicity we have been
ruling these topics out of consideration. Some 'incidental attention is given them in
the note at the end of this chapter and theEe is a further comment on exchange rates
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of banks and U. S. monetary funds upon the moneyflows of other trans-
actors has pictured banks and U. S. monetary funds as financial inter-
mediaries between two classes of nonbank transactors, the loans and
securities class and the cash balances class —betweenthose whose
obligations the banking sector holds and those who hold the currency
and deposit liabilities of the banking sector. When bank credit is ex-
panding there is a financial moneyflow from those who are mainly
holders of cash balances through banks and U. S. monetary funds to
those who are mainly obligors to the banking sector. When bank credit
is contracting there is a financial flow in the other direction.
This suggests that the influence of banks and U. S. monetary funds
upon the moneyflows of other transactors can be explored by analyzing
the various net intersector financial flows into components so as to dis-
close the relations between the active hoarding and dishoarding of loan-
fund balances on the one hand and the two-step financial flows that
pass through banks and U. S. monetary funds on the other. In this section
we will undertake with the aid of a component analysis of net financial
flows to examine these relations and to determine for our seven year
period, if possible, how far banks and U. S. monetary funds may have
encouraged and assisted bullish sectors in financing stepped-up expen-
diture programs, how far they may have retarded or restricted such
expenditure programs, and whether they have encouraged bearish con-
tractions of expenditures.'2
What we haye said on these matters above implies that the banking
sector stands in an asymmetrical relation to expansions and contractions
in the aggregate of ordinary transactions. We believe such asymmetry
is an inescapable corollary of our tentative hypothesis. A financial source
of money is a necessary condition to a bullish expansion of expenditures;
so is a bullish inclination. Banks can offer such a source and can play
the active role in bringing source and inclination into contact; they have
not much leverage to induce the inclination. In the downward direction
their influence is stronger. They can refuse to provide the financial
source; and they can call back noney they have previously advanced.
They can start or accelerate a recession; they can't do much to stop it
—theycan't convert bears into sheep or sheep into bulls. They can
accelerate, restrain or stop an expansion; they can't start one all by
themselves.
'Wemust expect, with our accounts on an annual rather than a quarterly basis and
with the broad transactor groups we have adopted, that there will be highly signifi-
cant financial flows that are not revealed.298 CHAPTER 13
But are we right about this asymmetry? Or have we perhaps omitted
something significant about, the nature of monetary and banking in-
fluences on moneyflows? Fisher in the chapter head quotation was evi-
dently thinking in terms of a symmetrical relation, as have many others,
a relation in which the banking sector could stop a contraction and start
an expansion of total ordinary transactions by buying loans and securities
from nonbank transactors and paying for them with its currency and
deposit liabilities. Some economists, among them Fisher, have held that
a bank credit policy aimed at and succeeding in eliminating cyclical
fluctuations from nonbank cash balances13 would practically prevent
cyclical fluctuations in the volume of ordinary transactions. Other eco-
nomists, not going this far, have held that if a bank credit expansion
policy were sufficiently vigorous, it could stop a contraction of money-
flows and raise business activity to something like a full employment
level.
Certainly our tentative hypothesis implies that a Federal bank credit
policy that aimed at and succeeded in maintaining nonbank cash bal-
ances would not by itself be adequate to prevent or stop a cyclical con-
traction in moneyflows. Even if the Federal Reserve were able, when
nonbank bearish transactors were preponderant, to increase nonbank
cash balances substantially —andthat means to more than offset the
probable propensity of banks to pile up excess reserves —this,on our
hypothesis, would not stop or retard a recession. Active cash balances
can decline, and idle cash balances increase, with a cyclical decrease in
the volume of ordinary transactions, as they apparently did in 1937-38.
Federal Reserve maintenance or expansion of total bank credit might
conceivably prevent a cyclical downswing from being accelerated by
any action of banks. But there is no reason to think that this would
significantly restrain bearish stinting and hoarding.' Presumably only
the form of hoarding would be changed, not its amount; with reduced
portfolio yields bears would prefer to hoard cash rather than securities.
Moreover, if bank credit is maintained or increased 'by Federal Reserve
purchases of governments,'4 it is somewhat improbable a, contraction of
bank customer loans will be prevented. Even if total bank credit were to
be expanded, the balling of customer loans and renewal refusals might
still aggravate the recession. What the Federal Reserve'can do to alleviate
15'Usuallydefined in this connection as excluding time deposits.
If purchases ofgovernments by the banking sector were confined to purchases from
the Treasury, as several versions of the 100 percent reserves plan require, their influ-'
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the perverse cycle in credit analysis during a business recession remains
to be determined. According to our tentative hypothesis, the most im-
portant thing a liberal Federal bank credit policy can accomplish in such
a time is to keep banks from accelerating the downswing.
The discretionary hypothesis does, indeed, attribute some further re-
straining influence to bank credit policy during a recession. Let us
suppose that a sufficiently vigorous policy of expanding Federal Reserve
credit does lead to an increase in total bank credit. Three resu1t should
follow. First, to the extent that the added bank credit means decreased
portfolios and increased cash balances for nonbank transactors, the
change in composition will be in the direction of greater liquidity; and
increased liquidity should be a mild encouragement to bullishness.
Second, the prices of remaining nonbank portfolio items may be pre-
vented from declining as much as they otherwise would have declined
and some of them may even be improved; nonbank transactors may
enjoy capital gains. However, the distribution of the capital gains will
depend upon the initial distribution of portfolio holdings; and if what
banks buy is mainly marketable U. S. securities the chief gains will accrue
to holders of these marketable securities. Third, interest rates will pre-
sumably be reduced. However, reductions on some categories of loans
may be less than those on others; and the perverse credit analysis cycle
may still mean that banks are timid about new customer loans, particu-
larly perhaps to small businesses.
Increased liquidity, capital gains, and reduced interest costs are all
factors fayorable to an expansion of the volume of ordinary transactions.
But these three effects of bank credit expansion fall a very long way
short of being powerful enough to make bank credit policy alone a
dependable means of stopping business recessions.'5
So much for the implications of our tentative hypothesis as to the ways
in whicjs an easy bank credit policy might exert an expansionary influ-
ence when bearish. transactors are predominant. There is need next to
"Arthur F. Burns has urged that we have concentrated attention on the cyclical
effects of Federal bank credit policy, neglecting its longer term implications. Certainly
he is right, and right in implying that the limitations on Federal bank credit policy
which apply to its cyclical effects may not apply to the longer term trend. But so long
as we have a cycle it will be difficult to separate cyclical and trend effects with assur-
ance. We have pointed out three ways in which an easy Federal bank credit policy
might encourage an increase or discourage a decrease in moneyflows: through in-
creased liquidity of nonbank loanfund balances, through lower interest rates, and
through higher capital gains or lower capital losses on portfolios. Quite possibly, on
all three counts, the secular effects of an easy Federal bank credit policy may be more
significant than its cyclical effects.300 CHAPTER 18
introduce an amendment to that hypothesis as we outlined it in Chapter
12. We there stated it in terms of a net deficit on ordinary account for
bulls during expansion and a net surplus on ordinary account for bears
during recession. For the sake of simplicity we spoke as if the entire net
financial flow could be manipulated by a transactor when he is actively
exercising his discretion to expand or contract his ordinary expenditures.
But in Chapter 11 and in Implication 9 of the features attributed to the
money circuit we urged that a transactor has relatively little separate
discretion over the changes in his active balances.
Strictly speaking we should divide the net financial flow into two
parts, one arising from net changes in active loanfund balances (active
cash, trade receivables, and trade payables), the other from net changes
in the remainder of the loanfund balances (i.e., in what we have called
idle balances). And we should amend the hypothesis by combining the
net financial flow ascribable to changes in active balances with the
surplus or deficit on ordinary account. The. hypothesis would then be
expressed in terms of the effective net surplus or deficit (from ordinary
transactions plus active balance changes) on the one hand and changes
in the rest of the loanfund balances on the other. For most transactors the
latter means changes in idle cash, in portfolios, in paid-in capital, and in
other debts payable.
While strict logic calls for such an amendment, expediency suggests a
compromise. In the first place it has not seemed wise within the limits
of this exploratory study to attempt to estimate active cash balances. We
are in a position to make only a part of the indicated correction —to
separate out of the net financial flow the effect of changes in book credit
and to combine this effect with the ordinary account. Second, this par-
tial correction has two incidental advantages. When we make it we arrive
at a concept that has considerable currency, the cash surplus or deficit.
Also, it is very convenient to work with the cash surplus or deficit in
relating the moneyflows of other transactors to the operations of banks
and U. S. monetary funds. However, if we state our hypothesis in terms
of cash surpluses and deficits we must bear in mind the necessity of
making a rough supplementary allowance for the way changes in active
cash balances may influence transactors' discretion.
When we come presently to recapitulate the discretionary hypothesis
we shall speak in terms of cash surpluses and deficits and of the net nego-
tiable financial flow (net flow exclusive of the effects of changes in trade
receivables and trade payables). And we shall shortly offercomponent
analysis of this net negotiable financial flow designed to show the part
banks and U. S. monetary funds play in it.BANKS AND OTHER TRANSACTORS' MONEYFLOWS 301
But first we need to pursue the subject of Section 2 a little further.
Presumably our component analysis should answer the question, To
what transactors is the banking sector extending credit? It would be easy
to give a clear-cut answer to this question if bank credit consisted entirely
of customer loans broadly conceived, i.e., if banks and U. S. monetary
funds acquired loans and securities only from the obligors and if liquida-
tion of bank credit always took the form of repayments by obligors. But
the fact of the matter is, a substantial part of bank credit transactions
may be in the open market.
If the customer loan assumption were valid in the broad sense indi-
cated, we would analyze bank credit by obligors. One component of the
financial flow of each sector -—households,Federal government, indus-
trial corporations, etc. —wouldbe the increment in its debt to barks.
And apart from changes in cash, the rest of the negotiable financial flow
(changes in other negotiable claims receivable and payable) of most
transactors might be attributed mainly to the open market.
The customer loan assumption, even in its broad sense, implies that
banks do not engage in open market operations, and this is surely con:
trary to fact. Nevertheless, we believe the component analysis this as-
sumption suggests is both valid and highly informative. It will not tell
us who sold whose debt to whom, but it will correctly report the resulting
changes in debtor-creditor relations, and these are more significant. In
particular it will identify the creditor relationships of the banking sector
with its large and highly variable portfolio. Because it reveals the obligors
of the various elements in this portfolio and not the parties from whom
these elements were immediately acquired, it can help to indicate the
probable incidence of changes in bank credit policy.
We have said that the relation of the banking sector to the business
cycle is asymmetrical. The point just made suggests a further aspect of
this asymmetry. Contraction and even the tightening of credit is bound
to the past in a way that expansion is not. Particularly in contraction the
effects of present banking operations are conditioned by the composition
of present bank portfolios; that means they are conditioned by the past
bank credit operations that have helped to fix that composition. Simi-
larly, present Federal Reserve policy toward open market sales is condi-
tionéd by its past operations. The System can only sell what it previously
bought. This suggests a broad question we believe economists have inade-
quately explored : What are the possibilities and limitations of the ad-
vance planning of the composition of bank credit,especially when bank
credit is expanding but when there is no urgent immediate occasion to
tighten credit? As it applies to the Federal Reserve System in particular,302 CHAPTER 13
this question must be rephrased: What would be the possibilities of the
advance planning of the compsition of Federal Reserve credit, if such
credit could include all the items eligible for inclusion in member bank
portfolios? And what statutory restrictions on bank portfolio items for
inclusion in Federal Reserve credit are advisable?
The Federal Reserve credit policies we have chiefly considered above
are often thought of as general, in contrast to selective credit policies.
But total bank credit policy is selective in a sense; it discriminates between
different classes of transactors. By tightening credit when the demand for
gross national product appears to be pressing upon the supply, banks
may be able to restrict a part of the demand, a part that needs to be
financed. But one cannot logically escape the fact that if a policy of
tightened bank credit is effective in this way, what it effects is a rationing
of purchases of gross national product. It restricts the purchases of some
would-be purchasers by making bank credit unavailable to finance them,
or perhaps by forcing those already in debt to banks either to find refi-
nancing elsewhere or else to stint and pay off their debts. Clear recogni-
tion of this fact helps us to understand why a tight credit policy is likely
to be unpopular when there seems to be an occasion for it. But such
recognition also raises two pointed questions in regard to a tightening of
credit to restrain an overexpansion of moneyflows. How far is it advisable
to embark upon a rationing program without being perfectly clear whose
rations are being cut? Is a tightened credit policy the instrument most
likely to cut the rations that most clearly merit cutting? We have already
suggested that, under our present governmental organization, Federal
•Reserve credit policy cannot be unqualifiedly identified with Federal
credit policy. And in so doing we have intended to imply a need for a
coordination of Federal credit policies. By these two questions we mean
to imply a still broader need, the need to coordinate Federal credit and
other Federal policies toward expansions and contractions in money-
flows.
With these comments on the relations of banks and U. S. monetary
funds to negotiable financial moneyflows in mind let us proceed to a
quantitative analysis of these flows. What we propose is to analyze the
net negotiable inflow of a nonbank sector into three componentsthe
decrement in cash balances, the increment in obligations held by banks
and U. S. monetary funds, and the increment in the net balance of other
negotiable claims payable. For one sector, the rest of the world, we shall
show also a fourth component, gold imports.
The information needed for this rough analysis, in addition to that inATotal Loana & Securitiea
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The Component analysis can readily be derived from Tables 28, 29,
31, and 41, the Cash decrement from Table 28, the increment in debt
held by banks and U. S. monetary funds directly from Table 41, and the
third Component (the increment in the net debt to others, or net funds
from the open market) as a residual. The computation of the residual
component for each sector involves three steps: (1) determination of
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preceding tables, is a distribution of bank credit (loans and securities)
by obligors (see Table 41). The detail on bank portfolios available for
this period is not very satisfactory and several crude apportionments
have been necessary. It has therefore seemed wise to make two sector
combinations. Industrial corporations and business proprietors and part-
nerships et al appear as a single sector on line D and private insurance
carriers and security and realty firms et al on line H.
Table 41
Bank Credit Classified by Obligors
(Billions of Dollars)
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the excess of those negotiable claims owed over negotiable claims owned
that are, shown in Tables 29 and 31; (2) subtraction of the debt held by
banks (we shall refer to'the remainder as net due to the open market,
etc.); (3) computation of the increment in the net balance of claims
due to the open market, etc. We shall not attempt to take account of the
valuation adjustment (gains and losses on securities) in this component
analysis.
For convenience the cash surplus for each sector is shown in Table 42.
We believe these estimates represent what is commonly meant by a cash
surplus. Technically it has been computed as ordinary receipts minus
ordinary expenditures plus money obtained through trade credit chan-
nls (the increment in trade payables minus the increment in trade
receivables plus debts forgiven and receivables recoveries minus bad
debt write-offs). Theoretically the cash surplus or deficit so computed
should equal the net negotiable financial flow. For any nonbank trans-
actor the cash surplus or deficit summarizes the effects of all transactions
except loan and security transactions (and except gold movements in
the case of the rest of the world) on the cash balance. But we cannot
expect the computed net negotiable financial flow and the computed
cash surplus or deficit to agree precisely, chiefly because of the discrep-
ancies in the moneyflows accounts. (A second cause of disagreement is
that we have not applied the valuation adjustment a/c loans and securi-
ties in the computation of the net negotiable financial flow.)
The component ana1rses for four sectors appear as ordinate incre-
ments in Charts 10-13. An upward step reports a source of money, a
downward step a disposition of money. (If was necessary to use a con-
densed vertical scale for the Federal g9vernment.) In order to include
asset balances in this form of presentation the asset scales have been made
to read downward. The steps show annual increments in the year end
balances; for convenience they are plotted at the midyear. For any year
the algebraic sum of the steps on the lower grids for each sector equals
the step on the top grid.
During most of the seven years something like half of the Federal
government's deficit financing took the form of increased Federal debt
held by banks; and during 1941 and 1942 Federal loan and security
financing was partly offset by an accumulation of the cash balance
(Chart 10). During six of the seven years the Federal government
expanded its ordinary expenditures, and banks greatly assisted the gov-
ernment in raising the funds to finance these expanded expenditures.
But of course banks and U. S. monetary funds arc not a unified person-BANKS AND OTHER TRANSACTORS' MONEYFLOWS 305
Chart 10
Major Components of the Net Negotiable. Financial Flow
to the Federal Government
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Chart 12
Major Components of the Net Negotiable Financial Flow
to Industrial Corporations and Business Proprietors et al
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Chart 13
Major Components of the Net Negotiable Financial Flow
to the Rest of the World
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ality, separate from the Federal government, in such operations; the
central banking authority is a Federal agency.
During the period under consideration bank credit was a very small
factor in the negotiable financial flow of households. And in four of the
years households both accumulated cash balances and added to the net
balance of negotiable claims receivable through open market operations.
If banks exercised much third-party influence over household money-
flows during these seven years, Chart 11 does not disclose it.
One of the significant facts brought out by these charts is the virtual
lack of relation during the period covered between bank credit changes
and the negotiable financial flow of industrial corporations and business
firms et al. An increase in bank holdings of business obligations contrib-
uted slightly more funds in 1936 than were absorbed by the increment in
cash balances. Although indebtedness to banks increased in 1941, busi-
nesses as a whole appear to have had a cash surplus. These seven years
are probably an exceptiohal period, but certainly Chart 12 suggests that
banks may have moved a long way toward getting themselves out of
touch with the business sector of the loan and security markets. Even
during the.seven years, however, potential bank influence over business
was considerable because of the $14 billion and more of business obliga-
tions held.
Had these three component analyses (Charts 10-12) included trade
credit the picture would not have been very different. The Federal gov-
ernment used some funds for book credit in 1940. (pre-payments). and
obtained about $2-i /3 billion in 1942 through increased trade payables.
A very gradual increase in household trade payables provided them some
funds during the first six years of the perioi. About a billion (chiefly
instalment debt) was paid off in 1942. Increases in net trade receivables
of industrial corporations and business firms involved sothe use of funds
during 1936, 1937, and 1939; during 1940-42 such increases averaged
about $1.5 billion a year.
The component analysis for the rest of the world brings out forcefully
the minor role of bank credit in the interhational financial flow during
the period under Observation, and the dominant role of gold movements.
The details revealed by Charts 11-13 are not especially striking. We
think this is due to the particular behavior of the components (on an
annual basis) during the seven year period, not to defects in the compo-
nent analysis. We suggest that this type of component analysis brings out
clearly the role of banks and U. S. monetary funds in the money circuit
and is a device that much of the time should prove extremely useful.1942
14.5
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Economists have sometimes thought of cash balances as a potential
source of money promoting bul1ishness Do these charts indicate that
during the seven years bulls drew down cash balances to help finance
ordinary expenditures? The Federal government drew down its balance
slightly in 1936 and again in 193 9-40, and the rest of the world did so in
1941. If these are cases in point they do not amount to much. We believe
it would not be proper to construe the 1937 decrease in the cash of indus-
trial corporations and business firms et al in this way. Although when we
look at 1937 as a whole industrial corporations appear to have been bulls,
their year end declines in cash and in trade receivables and payables (see
Table 22) should presumably be taken to reflect the fourth-quarter drop
in business activity. As the figures stand, they do not indicate any exten-
sive use of cash balances, during the period of our inquiry, to finance
bullish GNP purchases.
However, it is well to note that the evidence on this point can be made
to tell a different story if we change the sector grouping. For some pur-
poses it is advantageous to think of the Federal government and banks
and U. S. monetary funds as one transactor group, and to show a con-
solidated loanfund balance statement for this group. The decrement in
the cash balance (or increment in net currency and deposit liabilities)
then shows as a substantial financial source of funds.
WHEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENi AND THE BANKING SYSTEM
ARE TREATED AS ONE SECTOR (Billions of Dollars)
193619371938 1939 1940 194!
1Decrement in the consolidated5.1 —.5 2.15.87.46.0
cash balance of the Federal
government and the banking
sector (P&B V line b .rpinus
P&B VII line b)
2Line 1 minus the increment in3.9—2.0 .42.73.05.3 14,5
the gold stdck
3Total net negotiable financial4.6 —.1 1.12.62.08.838.8
inflow for the Federal govern-
ment and the banking sector
together(the increments in
Fig. 4a, top grid, minus P&B
VII line f)
Even when we count the monetary gold stock in the consolidated cash
balance, as in line 2, a substantial part of deficit financing is accounted
for by the cash decrement. Line 2 is over 80 percent of line 3 in 1936,
60 percent in 1941, and37 percent in 1942. In 1939 and 1940, partly
because the consolidated portfolio of the Federal government and bank-
ing system increased, the cash decrement exceeded the total net nego-
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may help to finance other things besides GNP expenditures (the con-
solidated portfolio increased also in 1936 and 1941 ).Sucha consolidated
presentation of financial flows makes the difference between financing
a war by issuing greenbacks and financing a war by issuing obligations,
the interest rates on which are kept down with the aid of the banking
system, look more like a difference of degree than one of kind.
4A Resume of the Discretionary Hypothesis
The interpretative comments on moneyflows and loanfund balances
offered in preceding pages refer most immediately to the annual esti-
mates for 1936-42 presented in Part Two. But a major consideration in
shaping the statements of payments and balances for the several sectors.
was that whenever feasible these annual estimates should be developed
from established statistical series. The behavior of many items in these
statements, therefore, either is known or can be approximately inferred
for a somewhat longer period than seven years and often more frequently
than at annual intervals. In attempting interpretations we have sought
to keep this wider range of information constantly in mind.
The interpretations may be grouped under two heads: those that are
somewhat closely linked to the scheme of moneyflow and loanfund
accounts we have elaborated and those of a more tentative nature. It is,
of course, impossible to draw a sharp line between these two groups of
interpretations, for there are many degrees of tentativeness. But broadly,
the account-linked interpretations may be said to cluster around the five
key features we have attributed to the money circuit and their ten impli-
cations while the more tentative ones comprise what has been called the
discretionary hypothesis.
The firmer interpretations derive their firmness in varying degree
from their association with the set of quadruple entry accourLts the esti-
mates constitute. They provide a basis on which one may theorize about
moneyfiows and about cash and other loanfund balances. We believe
that the portrayal of moneyflows through such a set of accounts is not
accidental to. the nature of moneyflows, that moneyflows by their very
nature require us to think in terms of some such accounting scheme, if
we are to think accurately In formulating the five key features and their
implications we have merely sought to give precision to familiar factual
statements and to systematize familiar economic relationships. We read-
•ily agree that this formulation may need amendment in detail, but we'
doubt that anyone can logically take major issue with this type of formu-
lation unless he is prepared to deny the quadruple entry basis on which
it rests.312 CHAPTER 13
Using this formulation as a foundation we have developed a discre-
tionary hypothesis concerning how changes in moneyfiows come about.
In working out this hyppthesis we have attempted to take account of
many facts beyond those included in our tables, but the testing to which
we have so far ben able to subject this theoretical framework is insufli-
cient to be definitive. We propose it merely as a tentative working hy-
pothesis, hoping it will prove useful in further inquiry.
The hypothesis has to do primarily with cyclical and secular variations
in moneyfirnvs. Seasonal and other within-the-year variations and spo-
radic variations are considered only incidentally. No attempt is made to
deal with cyclical and secular variations separately. In summarizing the
hypothesis here we repeat that it is not to be taken as an explanation of
the business cycle; it deals with only one aspect of the cycle —Inwhat
ways do the expansions and contractions in moneyflows come about?
It is convenient to repeat also several points asserted in the five features
and their implications.
The hypothesis ma be summarized as follows:
iShort and longer term functions of cash
The entire cash balance serves the value storage function. It stores up
cash surpluses and is a store that can be drawn upon to meet cash deficits.
The active cash balance is the part of the balance required for the short
term value storage function, i.e., for offsetting against each other the
temporary cash surpluses and deficits that are dqe to seasonal and other
within-the-year variations (and sporadic variations) in receipts and
expenditures. The remainder —theidle cash balance —servesthe longer
term or cyclical and secular value storage function.
Various other loanfund balances —claimsreceivable and claims
payable —-helpto perform both value storage functions.
iiDiscretion over idle cash
Transactors have discretion to increase cash balances by borrowing or
by selling loans and securities (or to decrease cash balances by debt
repayments and portfolio acquisitions) .Theycan exercise this discretion
over cyclical and secular variations in their idle cash balances.
iiiFreedom to spend more or to stint
As has been recognized by various writers, the total volume of ordinary
transactions could increase (or decrease) if all transactors simultaneously
increased (or decreased) their ordinary expenditures pan passu, so that
the receipts of each increased (or decreased) just as rapidly as his expen-
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actors discretion to increase (or decrease) their ordinary expenditures
by more than the change in their ordinary receipts. Those who dishoard
their idle loanfund balances to finance a more rapid increase in spending
than in receipts we call bulls. Those who stint (i.e., curtail their expendi-
tures more rapidly than their receipts decline) and hoard idle loanfund
balances we call bears. Other transactors re sheep. But we do not pre-
tend to distinguish these three groups very precisely; we take a sector's
cash surplus or deficit as an approximate measure of the change in its
idle net loanfund balances.
ivTwo interacling read justments
The total volume of transactions in the main money circuit during any
period is to be understood as a readjustment of the previous volume, a
readjustment that arises from the mutually conditi6ning cho:ices of bulls,
bears, and sheep. This readjustment always proceeds in two interacting
simultaneous phases. On the one hand there is a readjustment phase
affecting gross natfonal product expenditures, product receipts minus
nonfinal product expenditures (net product receipts), and transfers; we
include here also changes in trade receivables and trade payables;' this
phase of the readjustment takes place largely in the commodity, labor,
and service markets. On the other hand, there is a readjustment phase
affecting the loan and security markets and the flows of money through
financial channels.
We may characterize these two interacting readjustment processes as
the ordinary and the financial respectively. Each of them is, in large part
but not entirely an adjustment between changed supply conditions and
changed demand conditions, on the one hand changes in the demand for
and supply of commodities, services, and labor, 9n the other changes in
the demand for and supply of funds.
In 'the ordinary readjustment the initiative appears to lie mainly with
the demand changes, because most transactors have more discretion to
change ordinary expenditures than ordinary receipts. However, we must
not think of this as merely a readjustment between supply and demand.
Taxes, contractual commitments, and public purpose payments are
involved. And governments can initiate changes in their tax receipts.
It is a read justmen between the total of ordinary expenditures and the
total of ordinary receipts of all transactors.
In the financial readjustment process lenders and investors in securi-
ties and borrowers, issuers of securities, and those who wish to liquidate
portfolios must get together on terms in the loan and security markets.
But loan and security transactions are not the whole story. For the rest314 CHAPTER13
of the world gold imports into the U. S. have been an important source
of funds. And there are changes in sector cash balances to consider.
Through their influence on total nonbank cash balances and their par..
ticipation in the loan and security markets banks have a great deal of
discretion over the moneyflows through financial channels in which they
serve as financial intermediaries. Banks, of course, may be bulls or bears
on their own account but what they do in this respect does not matter
much. What does matter greatly is their relation 'to the negotiable finan-
cial flows.
vNegotiable financial moneyflows necessarily compensate cash sur-
pluses and deficits
When bulls predominate in this two-phase readjustment process, money-
flows increase, and those with cash deficits —chieflybulls because of
their higher level of spending —necessarilyobtain just enough money
from all other transactors through financial channels to meet their cash
deficits. When bears predominate, moneyflows decrease, and those with
cash surpluses —chieflybearsnecessarily advance or return just
enough money to meet the cash deficits of the rest of the economy that
occur when bears contract their spending.
When moneyflows are expanding, sheep are likely to contribute to the
expansion by adding to their ordinary expenditures, though as sheep
they will in general add less than the increase in their ordinary receipts.
When moneyfiows are contracting, the decrease in the ordinary expendi-
tures of sheep is likely to lag behind the decrease in their receipts. But the
lag is likely to be smaller and the downswing consequently steeper. Sheep
help to give the cyclical and secular fluctuations in moneyflows their
cumulative character.
A crucial question is, How is the readjustment process in the loan and
security markets so synchronized with the readjustment process that goes
on chiefly in the commodity, labor, and service markets as to make finan-
cial moneyfiows precisely compensate cash surpluses and deficits?
viIf there were no loan and security markets
During an expansion of moneyflows the ordinary receipts of most sheep
and bears are likely to exceed their ordinary expenditures, and they are
likely to accumulate cash. The cash balances of bulls may decline some-
what if they have large idle balances to begin with.
Conceivably the high spending level of bulls might be financed entirely
by drawing down their cash balances, and other transactors might merely.
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If so, i new money would pass through the loan and security markets,
and the net negotiable financial flow would be simply a transfer of. cash
balances.
Similarly, when moneyflows are contracting, the hoarding by bears
might conceivably be entirely in the form of increased cash balances and
the cash deficits of other transactors due to the stinting of the bears be
met merely by drawing down cash balances.
If total bank credit (also the gold stock and Treasury currency) were
constant, and if the cash surpluses and deficits of the various economic
sectors that accompany cyclical and secular variations in total ordinary
transactions were to be met entirely by shifts in the ownership of cash
balances, so that the negotiable financial moneyflows between sectors
consisted entirely of increments and decrements in sector cash balances,
these financial flows would necessarily exactly match the cash surpluses
and deficits of the several sectors.
viiCash keeps the loan and security markets in step vith ordinary
transactions
The matching between negotiable financial moneyflows and cash sur-
pluses and deficits is in no wise disturbed when we add loan and security
transactions to the analysis. All that is involved is a partial substitution
of loans and securities for cash in the shifts, a change in the form of the
financial flows. Transactors with cash deficits can obtain money through
financing by selling loans and securities instead of by drawing down their
cash balances. Transacthrs with cash surpluses can advance or return
money by buying loans and securities orretiring debt instead of advanc-
ing it in the form of an increment in cash.
Because lpan and security transactions take place only as they serve
as partial substitutes for changes in cash balances in performing the
function of offsetting cásh.surpluses and deficits, the readjustment proc-
esses in the loan and security markets are necessarily synchronized with
those that go on mainly in the markets for commodities, labor, and ser-
vices. It is dwindling cash balances that force transactors into the loan
and security markets to obtain money; accumulating cash balances are
necessary if transactors are to find it attractive to advance or return
money through these markets.
For convenience, we have stated the case in terms of cash surpluses and
deficits, but we must recognize a complication. A nonbank transactor's
requirement for active cash changes as his ordinary transactions increase
and decrease. An increase in the active cash requirement makes a trans-
actor's effectiv surplus smaller than his nominal cash surplus; a decrease/
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in the active cash requirement augments this surplus. Although we do
not have satisfactory estimates of year to year changes in active cash we
should qualify what we have said to allow for the difference between
effective surpluses and deficits and cash surpluses and deficits. -
viiiConvertibility has been extended to loans and securities
• Loan and security transactions may take place between one nonbank
sector and another, or banks and U.. S. monetary funds may intervene.
• In a flexible-price commodity market, demand and supply are adjusted,
in part at least, through adjustments in prices. There is this type of adjust-
ment in the loan and security markets too (through changes in interest
rates), but there is also one that is peculiar to loans and securities. Non-
bank transactors can sell more loans-and securities than nonbank trans-
actors buy, or they can sell fewer. Banks and U. S. monetary funds can
convert many kinds of loans and securities into cash for nonbank trans-
actors by simultaneous and equal increases in bank credit and in total
nonbank cash balances; or they can convert cash into-loans and securities
for nonbank trarisactors by simultaneous and equal decreases in bank
credit and in noñbank cash balances. Convertibility plays a significant
role in keeping th loan and security markets in step with ordinary trans-
• actions; -
Ofcourse this type of -convertibilityis not free. Interest offers an
inducement to nonbank tränsactors to convert idle cash into earning
assets; and it costs money to convert one's own debt or one's portfolio
I - - intocash.
-
• ixAre moneyflows and cash balances correlated?
During a cyclical expansi6n of total ordinary expenditures two factors
are likely to make for an expansion of nonbank cash balances. One is
the growth of active cash requirements that accompanies the increasing
-volumeof business; some transactors —--chieflybulls —willneed to
borrow or liquidate portfolios in qrder to build up their cash on hand.
The other factor is financial inadvertence; most sheep are likely to have
effective cash surpluses and to be slow enough about portfolio acquisi-
tions and debt retirements so that -they accumulate cash. Against these
two factors we may set some decline in liquidity preference. But such
a decline is unlikely to be more than a partial offset; the factors making
for, an increase in total nonbank cash balances can in general be cOunted
on to prevail. • -
• During a cyclical contraction of total ordinary expenditures reverse
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sheep incurring cash deficits, theremay be some inadvertent decline in
cash balances. At the same time liquidity preference increases. But in
this case the net outcome is less certain. If the recession is sufficiently
prolonged, the currency and deposit liabilities of the banking sector can
be confidently expected to decline. However, if the recession is sharp
and short they may show little or no change (as in 1937-38).
These considerations uggest some degree of correiation between cycli-
cal fluctuations in total ordinary expenditures and cyclical fluctuations
in nonbank cash balances. But they point to a line of causation that runs
from volume of moneyflows to quantity of money, not conversely. More-
over, they point to influences that have their immediate origin in deci-
sions of nonbank transactors. This certainly does not mean a denial of
influences that originate with the banking sector. Rather this means
that it is difficult to separate the influences the banking sector exerts on
the quantity of money from the influence it exerts on the volume of
moneyflows. Federai Reserve credit policy impinges on both.
xThe banking sector and total ordinary transactions
The banking sector influences total ordinary transactions by buying and
selling loans and securities. To a lesser extent it influences this total —
chieflythe transactions of the rest of the world —bybuying and selling
gold and silver. Its own ordinary transactions are of minor consequence
in this total.
We have concentrated attention on the major channel of banking
influence on moneyflows, expansions and contractions of bank credit.
The common accompaniments of such changes in the earning assets pf
the banking sector are equal and offsetting changes in its currency and
deposit liabilities. But wc must not suppose the interest-bearing obliga-
tions of each nonbank transactor it acquires are matched dollar for
dollar by an increase in that transactor's cash balance. If this were the
case the influence of the banking sector on other transactors' moneyflows
would be somewhat narrowly confined. It could permit (or restrain) an
expansion of moneyflows by permitting (or restraining) an expansion of
active cash balances, but its role in such an expansion would be essentially
a passive one. Also it could compel a decrease in total ordinary transac-
tions by 'liquidating its portfolio and compelling a decrease in active
cash. But if the effects of a contraction of bank credit could be so evenly
distributed —andthis seems unlikely -—--theyshould cause no one any
serious financial distress. Clearly on the upswing and apparently in
rdcession also the potentialities of the banking sector would be seriously
understated on such a view. *318 CHAPTER 13
The most important aspect of the influence of the banking sector on
the moneyflows of other transactors arises from the fact that commonly
some transactors are getting into (or out of) debt to banks while others
are increasing (or decreasing) their cash balances. This means a finan-
cial flow from one group of nonbánk transactors through the banking
sector to another, a flow in which the banking sector acts as an inter-
mediary between two nonbank transactors. Now as the intermediary
the banking sector is something more than an ordinary middleman: It
enjoys certain strategic advantages in connection with these financial
flows, advantages that are sufficient to make bankers the leaders of the
business community, at least so far as cyclical fluctuations in moneyflows
are concerned.
During a cyclical upswing the financial flows in which the banking
sector serves as an intermediary go chiefly to bulls and come chiefly from
sheep. The sheep advance money to banks by inadvertent increases in
cash balances. The sheep, indeed, have three options when their ordinary
receipts increase: (1) They can spend more (and the more sheep spend
the less bulls will need to raise through financial channels); (2) They
can increase their portfolios or pay off their debts (thereby supplying
funds directly to the loan and security markets); or (3) They can pile
up cash (thereby advancing money to the banking sector which it can
relend). In effect banks can borrow money (by expanding their deposit
liabilities) and lend it to bulls without stopping to obtain consent from
the sheep who are the ultimate lenders (i.e., the ultimate creditors). This
makes bank credit expansion a particularly convenient and effective
mans of financing an expansion of moneyflows. During the seven years
studied a substantial part of the financial moneyflows required to offset
Federal cash deficits took the form of increases in government obliga-
tions held by banks, but the cash deficits and surpluses of other sectors
apparently were not in any important sense thus offset by changes in
bank credit.
If the banking sector can actively promote a cyclical expansion of
business by advancing funds to bulls, it can 'also retard such an expansion
and both compel and accelerate a contraction.
Bank credit policy can restrain an expansion of moneyflows. It can
discourage' bulls by increasing the costs of financing. It can also help to
see that they are refused additional accommodation, if further expansion
of total bank credit is sufficiently restricted or if it encourages more severe
credit analyses. However, since credit is fluid we must reckon with the
possibility that financial moneyflows may under some circumstances
detour the restrictions of a tight bank credit policy.
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A contraction of bank credit —particularlyof customer loans and
mortgages —islikely, unless it is a very gradual one, to force bank debtors
to stint and hoard, i.e., to convert bulls and sheep into bears. In times
past rapid bank credit contractions have caused serious and extensive
financial distress, accelerating and, before the Federal Reserve Act, help-
ing to precipitate contractions of moneyfiows. It is doubtful whether
present Federal Reserve powers are adequate to prevent banks from
accelerating a moneyflows contraction, but during the only recession in
the seven years studied banks do not appear to have exerted a significant
influence of this type.
Once a business recession is under way the banking sector can do little
to stop it or to initiate an upturn. It cannot effectively deter anyone from
stinting and hoarding or induce anyone to dishoard and spend. But when
there are credit-worthy would-be bulls,, the banking sector can actively
contribute to recovery by discovering and financing them.
This is the hypothesis or theoretical framework we propose. Like the
five key features and their implications on which it is erected, it has to
some extent been couched in terms of the special details we have assigned
to the statements of payments and balances. And, as with the features
and their implications, we believe the validity of the hypothesis or frame-
work is largely independent of these special details.
To add imputed items to the accounts would not affect cash surpluses
and deficits, for any such added item would be ad addition to both a
sector's expenditures and its receipts. Imputed items are among the many
significant quantitative facts about our economy that are not measures
of moneyflows. Certainly they can contribute to an understanding of
what goes on in the money circuit and why. various transactor groups
manage their moneyflows and loanfund balances as they do. But there
is no reason to think that adding them to Table 33 wuid make, the
moneyflows themselves behave any differently, or require us to restate
the processes by which moneyflows expand and contract.
Exclusion of offset settlement items would distort the picture of gross
national product expenditures, net product.receipts,, and transfers (Table
33), and make it awkward to interpret. But it would not, disturb the•
balance of any account, or call for any modification in the description
of how expansions and contractions in moneyflows take place. Nor
would changes in the detailed scheme of classification of ordinary trans-
actions be likely to require any major modification in the statement of
the hypothesis. .
Hadwe defined cash balances differently, it would be necessary to
alter the negotiable financial flow component analysis (Charts 10-13)320 CHAPTER13
accordingly. The apparent composition, but not the net amount, of
financial flow would be changed. A similar comment applies to the
effects that. might be expected from the inclusion- of technical transac-
tions in the moneyflows accounts. Various plus components and minus
components would be added to the financial flow analysis, but the added
plus components and the added minus components would always pre-
cisely neutralize each other.
The nature of the statement of payments and balances depends sig-
nificantly on the way we,have elected to draw the line between ordinary
transactions and financial operations. Many close accounting decisions
entered into the drawing of this line. Increases in the paid-in capital
of corporations appear as a financial source (decreases as a financial
use) of funds for transactor groups III, VII, and X. Changes in the
paid-in capital of other enterprises are a component of the ordinary
moneyflow, net owner takeouts (which isan ordinary use of money for
groups II, IV, and X). The failure to treat changes in noncorporate
paid-in capital as financial presumably makes unincorporated enter-
prises appear slightly less active in the exercise of discretion than they
should appear (Charts 8 and 9).
In Chapter 11 we noted that as a result of the way we drew the line
between ordinary and financial flows th accounts do not• reveal the
extent to which tangible asets may perform the storehouse of value
function. Undoubtedly it is theoretically possible fbr bulls to dispose of
a stock of tangibles as well as a stock of government bonds in order to
finance increased purchases of gross national product. But there is
another side to this possibility. A part of the cash deficit of a sector that
is expanding its GNP purchases may be due to the fact that this expan-
sion is accompanied by the acquisition of existing assets.
Certainly ti-je hypothesis we have outlined (or framework we have
proposed) should be interpreted with these possibilities in mind. A some-
what fuller balance sheet showing would be needed for this purpose.
Without attempting to go into the point in detail, we venture the guess
that during the seven years under review the most important modifica-
tion of our interpretation in this connection would be to recognize that
during the early war years a part of the Federal cash deficit was due to
Federal acquisitions of titles to real estate and of inventories.'6
One other aspect of the statistical and accounting conventions we
have adopted clearly bears on the interpretation of our hypothesis —the
The effect of real estate acquisitions appears in Table 11, line c. The effect of inven-
tory acquisitions was presumably somewhat larger; it may be said to involve an
overstatement of Federal GNP expenditures in Table 33 and an understatement of
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scheme of transactor grouping. A more detailed classification of trans-
actors might be expected to reveal cash surpluses and cash deficits that
have been offset against each other in the broad group statements here
presented. Again, as we have seen, combining sectors such as the Federal
government and banks and U. S. monetary funds may give quite a
different picture of the composition of financial flows. Further, as we
insisted in Chapter 12, if the economy is looked at in terms of too aggre-
gative a level the financial flows to which the hypothesis refers are lost
to view.
These considerations point principally to the need, for care in inter-
preting the hypothesis or framework. We do not believe they raise any
question of its validity, whatever may be said about its validity on other
grounds.
To flag its tentative nature and stress the need for much further testing
we have called the framework within which we propose to interpret
cyclical fluctuations in moneyfiows not a theory but an hypothesis. If it
should gain acceptance it would displace a framework for interpreting
these fluctuations that runs in terms of an hydraulic analogy for the
money circuit. To some the words 'test' and 'hypothesis' in this connec-
tion will suggest the possibility 'of a finding of fact, a critical fact that has'
yet to be found and that will determine the issue between these two alter-
native formulations.
This is one of the ways science proceeds, but it is certainly not the only
one. It is not the applicable procedure here. We claim to have demon-
strated in the note at the end of Chapter 12 that the hydraulic explana-
tion has many implications that are-inconsistent with a social accounting
approach to the study of moneyflows and that there is not much left of
the analogy if one does not accept these conflicting implications.'7 If so,
it should clearly be rejected by anyone who adopts the social accounting
approach. And we believe it would be difficult to gainsay either the gen-
eral validity of that approach or its great advantages in empirical inves-
tigation.
Unless one accepts the social accounting approach the question of
testing our tentative framework for interpreting cyclical plus secular
17Inthis note we also considered what is left of the equation of exchange approach
to the investigation of moneyflows when the hydraulic implications are expurgated.
The reader may wonder whether what is left constitutes an alternative framework.
The answer is, No.
We claim that what is left of the equation of exchange approach is the hypothesis
that there is a discoverable habit pattern that conforms to the following specifications:
1) Some (not fully agreed upon) total of moneyflows (for all, transactors, or for
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expansions and contractions in moneyflows in terms of transactor discre-
tion does not arise. If one accepts the social accounting approach, he will
require an interpretation within a framework consistent with the five key
features. Our hypothesis is a framework erected on this foundation.
When we speak of testing it, we mean testing by using it in further inves-
tigations of monevflows. We 'believe the hypothesis is one that will
well repay such probing. But it would be strange indeed, if the test-
ing the hypothesis would get by being so used did not lead to extensive
amendment.
Some may think we should have tried to summarize our hypothesis
in simpler language. But we have a less technical and rather less precise
alternative statement of it.
The dollar sign was showing; every sheet this symbol topped;
And that was odd because so many cyphers had been dropped.
The estimates arrayed themselves in columns and in rows;
They showed the cash each sector held; they showed its moneyflows.
"The time has come," the Walrus said, "To talk about inflation.
If all the cash outside the banks is cash in circulation,
Do you suppose that moneyflows increase as cash increases?"
"I wonder," said the Carpenter, "Let's take this thing to pieces."
They sat up in an ivory tower and watched the circuit-flow;
So quick and fast the dollars passed, they scarce could see them go.
The Carpenter was much perplexed, and broached this argument;
"I say! That's queer, but all the time some chap holds every cent."
The Walrus sighed as he replied, "We must investigate,
If there's no money in the land left free to circulate!
Queer's not the word. It's so absurd that I just can't believe it.
How can folks always hold their cash until payees receive it?"
agreed upon 'opening, average, or other) total cash balance. (We may add that the
fiscal period to which this function applies is not fully agreed upon).
2) There are no other variables in this equation of exchange except time. Each of
the other quantities in this equation'is a parameter, the value of which is to be deter-
mined by statistical inquiry as a 'best' fit.
3) This equation will be useful for controlling the moneyfiows total through the cash
balance total, not conversely. -
Thishypothesis does not constitute a separate alternative framework. It is both
entirely consistent with and a necessary corollary of the hydraulic approach. Unless
some such habit pattern can be established and confirmed by various investigators,
there would seem to be scarcely anything to be said for the hydraulic approach.
The relation of this hypothesis to the framework we have proposed is less clear-cut.
This is because the nonhydraulic equation of exchange hypothesis is so vague. On the
whole we regard it as a possible line of inquiry within the discretionary framework,
but one that is not too promising, particularly if attacked sector by sector. In any
case as an habit pattern hypothesis it must meet and down its competitors. It must
give, about as good a fit to the facts as any alternative that introduces other variables
that are independent of the cash balance total, or that uses another fiscal period
along with these other variables, or that approaches1the problem on a less aggregative
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And so they studied money to sate their curiosity,
Read books about its quantity and circular velocity,
Read books on the equation of exchange. "This means," they read,
"That cash flows like' a limpid stream." They wondered if instead
It flowed like electricity, and they found a chart by Sahm
That explained the money circuit in a wiring diagram.
"If money flows with more than lightning speed," the Walrus said,
"No wonder folks can hold their cash until their bills are paid."
They watched the moneyflows some more to check what they'd explained.
The business cycle cyked. The flows of money waxed and waned.
And while they looked, the flows increased as bulls began to buy.
This made the Carpenter exclaim, "I can't see where or why
Expansion gets its start. It's clear the bulls are spending more,
And clearly others spend as much as they 'spent heretofore;
But still the bulls must borrow to obtain the cash they spend,
And what they need to borrow, Jo, the others have to lend!"
The Carpenter began to weep. The cycle made him sore.
He wept again as flows declined, and more and more and more.
The Walrus sought to comfort him. In these bold lines tried,
"A simile is what we need, and a little brass beside.
The fluctuating flows are like a lengthy family tree;
Let's trace their line from Alger Dick who lived in poverty.
Dick helped his son, his son made good, left grandson lots to grow on.
The fourth in 'line was badly spoiled, and he went broke. And so on."
This greatly pleased the Carpenter, and led him to demand,
"Let's try to see just what takes place when moneyflows expand.
While trade is poor each man's receipts are low, because they all
• Have cut their spending to the bone. In time the bold recall
That there is money to be made by risking and investing.
As bulls they start to forward-spend, each item carefully testing.
They have to borrow for this spending. But the more they spend
The more receipts the others get; the more they have to lend."
"It's very well," the Walrus said, "To show the rest must get
Whatever money 'bulls may need to borrow. But the debt
Of bulls may not appeal to them; they may not choose to lend."
"Of course," the Carpenter agreed, "But bulls need not depend
On getting those from whom they buy to take their IOU's.
They may hold others' debts or idle cash that they can use,
Or maybe, banks will make them loans on good security,
Or, on their looks, when ticker-tapes proclaim prosperity."
"Yes, maybe," said the Walrus, for his doubt was not allayed.
"The spending and receiving that go on in marts of trade
Seem separate from financial operations in the Street.
But somehow bulls btain the money that they need to meet
Their bills when they spend more. Finance expands when trade expands,
So that the funds advanced to bulls just equal bulls demands.
It can't be trade that sets the pace, nor can it be finance,
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If he had been the Carpenter, he'd've wept at this impasse.
But as it was he merely looked in Carroll's looking glass.
The moneyfiows reversed themselves. He saw the bulls unspend.-
The rest of the economy he also saw unlend.
"Ah, now I see," he cried in glee, "that glass is marvelous.
What keeps finance and trade in step? The answer's, obvious.
It's money, cash on hand. And how does money turn this trick?
That too the glass reveals. To see it though you must look quick.
"At first we thought finance and trade precisely synchronized.
In point of fact that's not exact. Our views must be revised.
The bulls' receipts plus funds they raise will usually be
A little less or more than what they spend. Accordingly
Their cash on hand goes down or up. But bulls will scarcely let
Their cash get low.- They won't Spend much beyond the funds they get.
Still, funds may' be supplied when others hoard their cash on hand;
For banks can side with bulls, and when banks do then things are grand.
"I. don't mean when they're bulls themselve. That doesn't matter much.
But banks, if so inclined, can help bulls make the needed touch,
And this when bulls have touched the rest for all they can directly.
De jure banks assist with loans; that much you saw correctly.
But what banks lend is money that the rest provide when they,
With some of their receipts not used in any other way,
Just pile up cash. The rest, of course, may very well prefer
To make the loans themselves. If not, they scarcely can demur."
At this the Carpenter remarked, "The rest are mostly sheep.
They may get cash that they invest and cash they merely keep.
But they can also spend. The larger sheep's expenditure
The less bulls need to raise. And consequently bulls are sure
To get the funds they wish to spend, if only banks say 'yes'.
No matter how sheep use receipts they'll merely acquiesce.
Suppose sheep lend; suppose they spend andbulls have less to raise;
Suppose banks lend sheep's hoards. Bulls get their money all three ways."
The Walrus and the Carpenter were highly satisfied
With what they'd learned, and tried to see how it could be applied.
But as the author I was not content. I said, "Encore.
We beg you two economists, please, tell us something more:
How moneyflows contract; where money goes when bears elect
To stint and hoard. Your story's far from done in this respect."
At this polite request they merely roared like animals,
And that was scarcely odd because they'd both turned into bulls.A NOTE ON INTERNATIONAL MONEYFLOWS AND THE GOLD STANDARD
International moneyfiows have often been treated in economic theories as
if they had characteristics peculiar to themselves. In constructing money-
flows accounts for the various transactor groups that are something like
balance of intersector payments statements we emphasize the resemblances
between internal and external moneyfiows. Although comments on the
moneyflows account of the rest of the world are not properly part of the
subject announced for this chapter, several such comments may be ap-
pended here.
First, the moneyflows account for the rest of the world is unlike the ordi-
nary balance of payments statement in an important respect. It is looked
at from the opposite point of view as the title for this sector suggests. Debits
and credits are reversed. The statement of payments and balances for the
rest of the world shows sources of money for and dispositions of money by
the rest of the world, not sources for and dispositions by the U. S. economy.
Further, this statement of payments and balances differs from the state-
ments presented for other sectors, except banks and U. S. monetary funds,
in being a consolidated statement.18 It shows only those moneyflows of the
rest of the world that come from or go to the United States; and only the
net cash balance due from the United States; other loanfund balances are
similarly netted in this statement.
It is suggested th'a,t one reason why international moneyflows have been
supposed to have peculiar characteristics is in the nature of a statistical acci-
dent. The main outlines of the balance of international payments statement
were doubtless grasped at least roughly in quantitative terms a generation
or two before full-fledged statistical estimates began to appear regularly,
for this is one of the oldest fields of dollar-volume and other money-volume
statistics. This availability of 'a rough consolidated account must have
helped to channel economic theorizing into thinking of the nation as an
economic unit. Much of the classical theory of international trade, notably
the law of comparative costs, takes what Davenport called a collectivist
viewpoint. It treats the nation as if it were a single (consolidated) enterprise
which could gain by international trade.
In addition to the fact that its debits and credits are reversed, and that
it is a consolidated statement,, there are four principal peculiarities of the
moneyflows account for the rest of the 'world (1) Gold movements appear
as a special type of loanfund transaction. This peculiarity is shared with
the account for banks and U. S. monetary funds. (2) Although the account
for the rest of the world is a consolidated one, it portrays transactions of a
very large number of foreign transactors. Hence it is difficult to localize
the discretion over international moneyflows. Especially is• this the case
because one set of these foreign transactors may get the ordinary receipts,
a second set make the ordinary expenditures, and quite possibly a still dif-
ferent set engage in the loanfund transactions. But when there are ex-
'Ofcourse the statement for the Federal government is a statement,
since the government is regarded as a single transactor.
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change controls, discretion over the international moneyflows becomes less
decentralized. (3) The cash balance is not purely a dollar balance. This
difference is, in a sense, one of degree. The cash balances of other sectors
include some foreign balances. In particular the negative balance of banks
and U. S. monetary funds is net of the foreign balances held by U. S. banks.
But the cash balance of the rest of the world is more completely a net item.
It is an estimate of total dollar balances held abroad minus total foreign
balances held by U. S. transact9rs. During our seven years this net balance
appears to have been a positive quantity, but in times past it has presumably
been negative. (4) Although the moneyflows account is stated in dollars, a
substantial part of the transactions it reflects must have been entered into
in terms of other currexicies.
In Chapter 12 we interpreted the rest of the world as actively exercising
transactor discretion during most of th& seven years studied. Apart from the
difficulty of localizing discretion we see no reason to revise this interpreta-
tion. But it must be recognized that, because the international account may
'be looked at either as a statement of the moneyflows of the rest of the world
going to and coming from the United. States or of the moneyflows of the
United States coming from and going to the rest of the world, the evidence
in Chart 9 is ambiguous. The grid marked 'the rest of the world' can be
inverted (positive ordinates becoming negative and conversely) and re-
labelled 'the United States'. This will make the United States appear as
purchasing a negative amount of the 'gross national product' of the rest of
the world, and as obtaining a negative amount of money through interna-
tional financial channels. But there will be a positive correlation between
these two negative variables. When the product transactions are plotted on
a net basis, they make the United States out to be bearish quite as much as
they make the rest of the world out to be bullish. However, this ambiguity
can be resolved if we show the product transactions on a gross basis. During
most of the seven years it is the product expenditures of the rest of the world
in this country, not the product expenditures of this country abroad, that
are correlated with the net international financial flow. -
Threeresemblances between the moneyflows accqunt for the rest of the
world and those for other sector may be emphasized: (1) the account must
balance. Ordinary expenditures and other dispositions of money (Of dol-
lars) by the rest of the world are limited by their ordinary receipts and other
sources of money (of dollars). (2) The account includes product transactions,
(cash, not in kind) transfers, and loanfund transactions (capital move-
ments). Each of these three groups of transactions may show a balance that
is typically in one direction for a considerable period of years. If the account
for the rest of the world differs from the moneyflows accounts of other
sectors in this respect, it is because its pattern is subject to gradual but
wider changes. In the course of time the account for the rest of the world
may shift from a cash surplus pattern (during the 19th century) to a cash
deficit pattern (during and since World War I). It is conceivable, though
much less likely, that the account for households or industrial corporations
might make such a shift. (3) The cash balance helps to keep loan and
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here and also a difference. In times past at least, gold movements have
shared this function with cash in the case of international moneyflows. Fur-
ther, in internatiOnal moneyflows. the imperfections of the articulation of
the commodity and service markets adjustment and the loan and security
markets adjustment are mqre patent than in the case of internal flows.
These comments differ from the classical (Ricardian) statement of the
case most immediately in that they deny there is a marked secular tendency
for loanfund transactions and transfer items to wash, i.e., for the interna-
tional product account to balance by itself in the long run. Recurring capi-
tal movements and transfers may characterize an international balance for
long periods of time. Moreover, to the degree that international product
expenditures are kept in line with international product receipts the result
is achieved directly. The rest of the world, like any other sector, must have
sources of money in order to spend; the moneyflows account of product,
transfer, and loanfund transactions must balance.
If the context of the above comments is included, the difference from the
Ricardian statement is somewhat wider. International product expendi-
tures and product receipts are not kept in line by a causal chain of mechani-
cal proportional relationships within each country that runs from the
monetary gold stock to total nonbank cash balances to some average of
commodity prices. In the note at the end of Chapter 12 we indicated a set
of conditions —apreponderant influence of rop years and short pay
periods on transactor fiscal periods, general poverty, relative unimportance
of loan and security markets —underwhich moneyflows might behave
somewhat according to such a quantity theory causal chain.
This suggests that the Ricardian theory of international gold movements
may well have been more apropos in some past period than it is at present,
not so much because of changes in the monetary policies of nations as be-
cause of changes in institutional arrangements.
We venture to push this suggestion a bit further. In a commercial and
financial world dominated by a number of private enterprise countries of
not too unequal size, in the economy of each of which the rest of the world
is a very important sector, and government a much less important sector
than it is today, a world in which there is little trading in corporate bonds
and stocks, we might expect international gold movements to be somewhat
self-correcting. For in each of the leading commercial nations of such a
world we might expect the international moneyflows account to consist
mainly of (private) merchandise imports and exports and gold (and silver)
movements, so that a gold import would mean a favorable, and a gold
export an unfavorable, balance of trade. And we might expect each of these
nations to be fairly sensitive to changes in its foreign trade balance. But our
present world differs significantly from this one.
Some economists and some bankers have sometimes spoken as if we could
restore the self-correcting system of international gold movements by restor-
ing the international gold standard or as if the United States could, acting
unilaterally in this respect, achieve some stability in its prices and perhaps
in the level of its economic activity.
But restoring the gold standard presumably does not mean making exten-328 CHAPTER 13
sive changes in the institutional structure of our economy. Rather it means
certain technical modifications in Federal monetary policy. Let us note how
the aspects of monetary policy involved impinge on moneyflows and what
the modifications are:
1) The.Mint dominates the domestic price of gold. A change in the domes
tic price of gold affects the operating revenues of domestic gold producers
and the costs to those who are domestic users of gold in the industrial arts.
2) Subject to the conditions imposed by membership in the International
Monetary Fund the Federal government may change the value, of the
dollar in its exchange for other currencies.
3) The Federal. government may continue to adhere to the policy with
respect to Treasury currency it has pursued unswervingly for the past three-
quarters of a century. Alternatively the government might abandon this
policy and engage in deficit financing by issuing bearer demand notes'.that
are 'legal tender, as were greenbacks. Under present conditions each of these
three points is a separately determinable point in Federal policy.
We believe the three points just listed exhaust the present possible mean-
ings of "returning to the gold standard".'9 If anyone advocates such a policy
in an effective sense he must mean continuing our present 75 year old policy
with respect to the form of deficit financing (retirement of the fiat issue now
outstanding is of no material consequence), and/or establishment and
maintenance of a particular domestic price for gold, and/or establishment
and maintenance of a 'particularinternational exchange rate' level. Pro
forma of course, one may mean return to a situation in which exchanges
can be and are permitted to fluctuate between gold points, and in which
gold movements can be and are controlled only through international lend-
ing and borrowing and not directly. But this type of 'arrangement is merely
a technique for fixing the level of exchange rates, and it is the level fixed
that counts. Pro forma one may mean also the reintroduction of gold coin
and certificates into the cash balances of nonbank transactors, 'but unless
this involves one of the three points listed' we fail to see how it can affect
*thesize of any transactor's cash balance or the volume of any of his main
circuit moneyflows.
19Onemight also mean by the gold standard clothing a central banking authority
with powers sufficient to enable it to maintain an approximately constant ratio of
the total cash balances of nonbank transactors to the monetary gold stock, and direct-
ing the central banking authority to maintain such a ratio. In this sense of 'gold
standard' we could not return to it, since we were never on it. In this sense it is
clearly a'close relative of the Fisher 100 percent reserves proposal urged in the chap-
ter head quotation. ,